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Abstract
We consider the class of Bayesian environments with independent types, and utility functions
which are both quasi-linear in a private good and linear in a one-dimensional private-value
type parameter. We call these independent linear environments. For these environments,
we fully characterize interim eﬃcient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compat-
ibility and interim individual rationality constraints. We also prove that they correspond to
decision rules based on virtual surplus maximization, together with the appropriate incentive
taxes. We demonstrate how these techniques can be applied easily to the design of auctions,
markets, bargaining rules, public good provision, and assignment problems.
JEL classification numbers: 024, 026
Key words: public goods, mechanism design, interim eﬃciency, incentive compatibility, pri-
vate values
1 Introduction
This paper presents a general approach for solving optimal mechanism design problems in
a the class of Bayesian environments with independent types, and utility functions which
are both quasi-linear in a private good and linear in a one-dimensional independent private
value type parameter. We call these independent linear environments. We fully characterize
interim eﬃcient allocation rules which also satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim
individual rationality constraints in these environments. We also prove that these solutions
correspond to decision rules based on a virtual cost-benefit criterion, together with the
appropriate incentive taxes. We demonstrate through a series of illustrations how these
techniques can be applied easily to auction theory, bargaining, public goods, and other
standard problems of mechanism design. These solutions, some of which are by now well-
known are derived as simple corollaries of our characterization theorem.
Many papers have now been written on the optimal mechanism design for Bayesian
environments.1 While a variety of technical approaches have been taken, most of these papers
share a common mathematical structure, but this common structure is not transparent, as
these techniques are scattered across a number of articles, each of which focuses on a specific
application or feature of the general problem. Here, we exploit that common structure
to give a full characterization of interim eﬃcient allocation rules for what we call linear
independent environments. These environments have quasi-linear utility, additivity in taxes
in the feasibility constraints, and linearity of utilities in a one dimensional independent
private-value type. The general model embodies both public good problems and private
1See, for example, d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979), Dudek, Kim, and Ledyard (1995), Laﬀont and
Maskin (1979, 1982), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Myerson (1981), Gresik (1996), Cornelli (1996),
Wilson (1985), Wilson (1985, 1993), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), Ledyard and Palfrey (1994, 1999a,
1999b, 2002), Coughlan (1999), Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987), Cramton and Palfrey (1990),
Crémer, d’Asprement, and Gérard-Varet (1999), and others.
1
good problems in a single framework.
As is standard, we use the revelation principle, to enable us characterize eﬃcient alloca-
tion rules by restricting attention to direct revelation mechanisms. We use the separation
result of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) which allows the separate computation of
feasible incentive taxes. We will use an insight of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) which
reduces individual rationality constraints to a single constraint that does not involve the
incentive taxes. Our approach is closest to the original Mirrlees (1971) analysis of optimal
taxation for income redistribution, andWilson’s (1993) later study of ex ante optimal trading
procedures.
In contrast to the above papers, this paper is concerned with interim eﬃcient allocation
rules, using a concept first introduced by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). An allocation rule
is interim eﬃcient if there exists no other allocation rule that makes no type of any agent
worse oﬀ and makes some types of some agents better oﬀ. It is the natural generalization of
Pareto optimality to Bayesian environments where agents have private information. There
are only a handful of paper that explore the properties of interim eﬃcient allocation rules,
and these are limited to a few applications.2
The next section presents the basic notation and the model. Section 3 presents the
characterization results and proofs. Section 4 shows how the characterization is simplified
in the regular case and section 5 illustrates this approach with several applications to both
public and private goods environments. We make some concluding remarks in section 6.
2See Gresik (1996) and Wilson (1985) for applications to bilateral trade, particularly double auctions.
See Coughlan (2000), Laussel and Palfrey (2002) and Ledyard and Palfrey (1994,1999a, 1999b, 2002) for
applications to public good mechanisms. Perez-Nievas (2000) investigates the interim eﬃciency of Groves
mechanisms.
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2 The Model
There are N individual agents. An outcome consists of a social allocation and a profile of
taxes. A social allocation is an M-vector, denoted x = (x1, . . . , xM) which is an element of
a feasible set X ⊆ RM for some M > 0. Furthermore, the cost of the social allocation is
given by C(x), and a = (a1, ..., aN) ∈ RN is a profile of taxes for the agents, which must
collectively be suﬃcient to cover the cost of x.We denote the set of feasible profiles of taxes,
given an allocation x, by A(x) = {a ∈ RN |PNi=1 ai ≥ C(x)}. Formally, a feasible outcome
is a pair (x, a) ∈ Z where Z is the subset of X ×RM such that a ∈ A(x) for all x ∈ X.
Each player has a type, ti. We assume that each individual knows his own type and does
not know the types of the other individuals. We assume that the types are independently
distributed, with the (common knowledge) cdf of i’s type denoted Fi(·) and the support of
Fi is T i = [ti, t
i
] ⊆ R. We assume Fi has a continuous positive density on Ti. Note that
ti < 0 is allowed. The von Neumann Morgenstern utility function for type ti of agent i for
an allocation (x, a) is assumed to take the form V(x, a, ti) = tiqi(x)− ai.3
An allocation rule is a mapping from T = T 1 × · · · × TN into Z. A mechanism is a
game form consisting of a message set for each agent and an outcome function that maps
message profiles into probability distributions over the set of feasible allocations. A direct
mechanism is a mechansim in which the message set for each agent is simply T i. By the
revelation principle, any allocation rule that results from equilibrium in any mechanism is
also an equilibrium allocation rule of an incentive compatible, direct mechanism. Therefore,
the rest of the paper only considers direct mechanisms.
A strategy for i in a direct mechanism is a mapping σi : T i → T i : that is, a decision
rule that specifies a reported type for each possible type. We refer to the identity mapping
3In many applications, qi(x) is the quantity consumed by agent i in the social allocation x. However, this
is just one of several possible interpretations of q.
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as the truthful strategy, and denote it by =, so =(ti) = ti. We denote a feasible direct
mechanism simply as a function, η : T → Z.4 We denote the social allocation component of
η at type profile t by x(t) and the tax profile by a(t). We will refer to the pair (qi(x), ai) as
i’s allocation under η.
2.1 Incentive Compatibility
Besides resource feasibility, the two restrictions on η considered in this paper are incentive
compatibility and individual rationality. Incentive compatibility requires that it is a Bayesian
equilibrium of η for all agents to adopt a strategy of truthfully reporting their type. Given
a strategy profile σi : T i → T i and mechanism, η, let the interim utility of type ti of agent
i, assuming all others truthfully report their type, be denoted by:
bU i(η, ti, σi) = Z
T
[tiqi[x(σi(ti), t−i)]− ai(σi(ti), t−i)]dF (t|ti)
For convenience, we use a simplified notation for the case when σi = =, denoting U i(η, ti) ≡bU i(η, ti,=).
Definition 1 A direct mechanism η is (interim) incentive compatible if and only if U i(η, ti) ≥bU i(η, ti, σi) for all i, ti, σi.
2.2 Individual Rationality
We are also interested in allocation rules η which satisfy an interim individual rationality
constraint. This means each type of each agent will be at least as well oﬀ, at the interim
4By the linearity of these environments, there is no loss in restricting attention to deterministic
mechanisms.
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stage, by participating, as they would be by not participating. We assume the interim
expected utility of not participating in the mechanism does not depend on the mechanism,
but can depend on type. We denote this non-participation value by U0i(ti).
Definition 2 A direct mechanism η satisfies (interim) individual rationality if and only if
U i(η, ti) ≥ U0i(ti) for all i, ti.
2.3 Interim Eﬃciency
Definition 3 A direct mechanism η is interim eﬃcient iﬀ (a) η is feasible, (b) η is (interim)
incentive compatible and (c) η satisfies the (interim) individual rationality constraints for
each i and @ bη such that (a) bη is feasible, (b) bη is (interim) incentive compatible and (c) bη
satisfies the (interim) individual rationality constraints for each i and U i(bη, ti) ≥ U i(η, ti)
for all i, ti, and U i(bη, ti) > U i(η, ti) for some i and for all ti ∈ eT i ⊂ T i, where eT i has strictly
positive measure relative to T i.
The following well-known result5 is stated below, without proof:
Lemma 1 A direct mechanism η is an interim eﬃcient mechanism iﬀ ∃ λ =
©
λi : T i → R+
ªn
i=1
with
R ti
ti λ
i(ti)dF i(ti) > 0 for some i, such that η solves maximize
PN
i=1
R ti
ti λ
i(ti)U i(η(t), ti)dF i(ti)
subject to (a) η is feasible, (b) η is (interim) incentive compatible and (c) η satisfies the (in-
terim) individual rationality constraint.
We now proceed to characterize that set of interim eﬃcient mechanisms.
5See Holmstrom and Myerson (1983).
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3 The Characterization
3.1 Incentive Compatibility
3.1.1 Characterization
We first identify incentive compatible mechanisms in a useful way. For (interim) smooth
mechanisms6 when preferences are linear, the characterization of incentive compatibility in
terms of derivatives is well-known. There are basically two features of such mechanisms.
First, an envelope condition is satisfied, namely that the total derivative of the interim
utility for i with respect to type when players adopt truthful strategies is equal to the partial
derivative with respect to type (i.e., fixing the reports of all agents). Second, the interim
utility to i under truthful reporting is convex in i’s type. This is stated formally below,
without proof.
Lemma 2 (Rochet, 1987): If bU i is linear in ti, and U i is continuously diﬀerentiable, then
η is incentive compatible if and only if
∇tiU i(η, ti) = ∇ti bU i(η, ti, σi)
U i(η, ti) is convex in ti.
3.1.2 Reduced form allocations
For our problem, this characterization of incentive compatibility can be explained in terms
of each type’s reduced form allocation; that is, the expected value of that type’s allocation
6By interim smooth we mean that the reduced form allocation rules Qi(ti) =
R
qi(x(t))dF−i(t−i) and
Ai(ti) =
R
ai(t)dF−i(t−i) are twice diﬀerentiable in ti.
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under the mechanism, when all agents report truthfully. The reduced form social allocation
of type ti is denoted is Qi(ti) ≡
R
T q
i[x(t)]dF (t|ti), and type ti’s expected tax is denoted by
Ai(ti) ≡
R
T a
i(t)dF (t|ti). Therefore, it follows directly from above that ∇tiU i(η, ti) = Qi(ti),
and ∇ti bU i(η, ti,=) = Qi(ti)+ ti dQi(ti)dti − dAi(ti)dti where Ait and Qit are the derivatives of Ai and
Qi, respectively. Finally, U i is convex in ti if and only if dQ
i(ti)
dti ≥ 0 ∀ti ∈ T i. Thus η is
incentive compatible iﬀ, for ti ∈ t,
ti
dQi(ti)
dti
− dA
i(ti)
dti
= 0 (IC1)
and
Qiti(t
i) ≥ 0. (IC2)
3.2 The Constrained Optimization Problem
Collecting the above results, we can state the following theorem.
Theorem 1 An allocation rule η = (x∗, a∗) is interim eﬃcient among the set of feasible
incentive compatible mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, if and only if there exists a
system of type-dependent welfare weights, {λi : T → R+}Ni=1, with
PN
i=1
R
T i λ
i(ti)dF i(ti) > 0
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for some i, such that (x, a) solves the following constrained maximization problem:
max
x(·),a(·)
Z
T
(
NX
i=1
λi(ti)[tiqi(x(t))− ai(t)]
)
dF (t)
subject to :
x(t) ∈ X ∀t
NX
i=1
ai(t) ≥ C(x(t)) ∀t
Ai(ti) = Ai(ti) +
Z ti
ti
sdQi(s) ∀i and ti
dQi(ti)
dti
≥ 0 ∀i and ti
tiQi(ti)−Ai(ti) ≥ U0i(ti) ∀i and ti.
These constraints are, respectively, ex post feasibility for x, ex post feasibility for (a, x),
incentive compatibility (IC1 and IC2), and interim individual rationality. In Ledyard and
Palfrey (1999) we adopted the approach of Mirrlees (1971) and Wilson (1993) to characterize
the solution to this program in the special case of pure public goods, ignoring the last set of
constraints corresponding to individual rationality.. Here we use a more general framework
to highlight commonalties across the literature.
We first use a separation result of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) to establish
feasibility of simple transfer schemes that can be constructed in a balanced way to provide
the correct incentive scheme.
3.3 Incentive Taxes
To make the notation a bit simpler below, we provide a few new definitions here. We first
define an agent’s minimum net utility from a mechanism which is the surplus received by
8
the worst-oﬀ type of agent i, assuming incentive compatible transfers.
Definition 4 Given Qi and U0i, let
Li(Qi, U0i) ≡ min
ti
[tiQi(ti)−
Z ti
ti
sdQi(s)− U0i(ti)]
= min
ti
[tiQi(ti) +
Z ti
ti
Qi(s)ds− U0i(ti)]
= tiQi(ti) + min
ti
[
Z ti
ti
Qi(s)ds− U0i(ti)]
Remark 1 Li(Qi, U0i) − Ai(ti) is i’s minimum net utility given incentive compatible
taxation. A feasible incentive compatible mechanism satisfies interim individual rationality
if and only if Li(Qi, U0i)−Ai(ti) ≥ 0 for all i.
Next we define the expected budget surplus of an incentive compatible allocation rule
(summed over all agents).
Definition 5 Given an allocation rule x let
G(x) ≡
NX
i=1
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)− tiQi(ti)
#
−
Z
T
C(x(t))dF (t).
Remark 2 Notice that G(x) +
PN
i=1A
i(ti) =
hPN
i=1
R
T a
i(t)dF (t)
i
−
R
T C(x(t))dF (t). It is
the ex-ante budget surplus, given incentive compatible taxation.
The next step involves the separation of the transfer problem (the choice of a) from the
allocation problem (the choice of x), which is a well-known result.7 We include a proof for
completeness.
7See, for example, d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979).
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Lemma 3 If x : T → X satisfies dQi/dti ≥ 0, and {A0i}Ni=1 is any collection of N constants,
then ∃ a such that (x, a) is incentive compatible and feasible and A0i = Ai(ti) for all i, if and
only if
G(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
Ai(ti) ≥ 0.
Proof. For each i and t, let
ai(t) = αoi +
Z ti
ti
sdQi(s)− 1
N − 1
X
j 6=i
Z tj
tj
sdQj(s) +
1
N
[C(x(t))− Ci(ti) + 1
N − 1
X
j 6=i
Cj(j)]
where Ci(ti) =
R
T C(x(t))dF (t|ti) and
α0i = A0i +
1
N − 1
X
j 6=i
Z tj
tj
Z tj
tj
sdQj(s)dF j(tj)− 1
N
Z
T
C(x(t))dF (t)
If ai(t) is computed this way then for each t, then
NX
i=1
ai(t) =
NX
i=1
αoi + C(x(t))
10
Therefore, (x, a) is feasible if and only if
P
i α
oi ≥ 0, or, equivalently,
NX
i=1
(
A0i +
1
N − 1
X
j 6=i
Z tj
tj
Z tj
tj
sdQj(s)dF j(tj)− 1
N
Z
T
C(x(t))dF (t)
)
≥ 0
⇔
NX
i=1
A0i +
NX
i=1
Z ti
ti
Z ti
ti
sdQi(s)dF i(ti)−
Z
T
C(x(t))dF (t) ≥ 0
⇔
NX
i=1
A0i +G(x(·)) ≥ 0.
To verify that (x, a) is incentive compatible, observe first that dQi/dti ≥ 0 by hypothesis
and
Ai(ti) = α0i +
Z ti
ti
sdQi(s)
− 1
N − 1
X
j 6=i
Z tj
tj
sdQj(s)dF j(tj)
+
1
N
Z
T
C(x(t))dF (t)
= A0i +
Z ti
ti
sdQi(s).
so both IC1 and IC2 are satisfied and A0i = Ai(ti) for all i.
The inequality in the statement of the lemma requires that given incentive compatible
taxation, ex ante expected taxes are greater than or equal to ex ante expected costs. In
other words, it is only the ex ante budget balance constraint that is binding. Since one
can always find A0i such that (11) holds, one can always find type-dependent transfers to
balance the budget.
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3.4 Combining Incentive Constraints and Voluntary Participation
The next step is to obtain a more convenient form of the individual rationality constraint.
This is done by combining it with the feasibility and incentive constraints and then summing
over agents.
Lemma 4 If x : T → X satisfies dQi/dti ≥ 0, then there exists a such that (x, a) is incentive
compatible, feasible, and satisfies individual rationality if and only if
G(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
Li(Qi(·), U0i) ≥ 0.
Proof. (only if) Let a be such that (x, a) is incentive compatible, feasible, and satisfies
individual rationality. Incentive compatibility implies that there exist {A0i}Ni=1 such that:
Ai(ti) = A0i +
Z ti
ti
sdQi(s) ∀i, ti.
The individual rationality constraint is
tiQi(ti)−Ai(ti)− U0i(ti) ≥ 0 ∀i, ti.
Combining the two gives:
tiQi(ti)−
Z ti
ti
sdQi(s)−A0i − U0i(ti) ≥ 0 ∀i, ti,
or, equivalently,
min
(
tiQi(ti)−
Z ti
ti
sdQi(s)− U0i(ti)
)
≥ A0i ∀i
12
or
Li(Qi(·), U0i) ≥ A0i ∀i
Summing over i gives:
NX
i=1
Li(Qi(·), U0i) ≥
NX
i=1
A0i
From Lemma 3,
PN
i=1A
0i ≥ −G(x(·)), so
G(x(·)) + Li(Qi(·), U0i) ≥ 0
(if) Suppose G(x(·)) +PNi=1 Li(Qi(·), U0i) ≥ 0 and. For each i, let A0i = Li(Qi(·), U0i).
Summing over i gives:
NX
i=1
Li(Qi(·), U0i) =
NX
i=1
A0i
which implies
G(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
A0i ≥ 0.
From Lemma 3, this implies the existence of a such that (x, a) is feasible and incentive
compatible for all i and A0i = Ai(ti) for all i. By construction A0i = Li(Qi(·), U0i) which
implies that (x, a) satisfies individual rationality.
Remark 3 A useful corollary is: There exist {A0i}Ni=1 such that G(x(·)) +
P
iA
0i ≥ 0 and
Li(Qi(·), U0i) ≥ A0i for all i if and only if G(x(·)) +Pi Li(Qi(·), U0i) ≥ 0.
Remark 4 Lemma 4 is useful in checking whether a particular incentive compatible (x, a)
satisfies IR. It does not help in computing an appropriate x∗ to solve the optimization prob-
lem.
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Remark 5 As an example, in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) there are two types of
agents, a buyer, B, and a seller, S, and C(x) = 0.
Individual rationality reduces to:
ti0Q
i(ti0)− Li(Qi(·), U0i) = 0 for B
and:
ti0Q
i(ti0)− Li(Qi(·), U0i) = −
Z ti
ti
Qi(s)ds for S,
since each trader can guarantee himself the no trade outcome. B has no endowment, but S
has the option to keep the object and receive U0i(ti) = ti. Using these two identities, and
the constraint, G(x(·)) +Pi Li(Qi(·), U0i) ≥ 0, yields the familiar inequality (extended for
arbitrary numbers of buyers and sellers), :
X
i∈B
Z ti
ti
(ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
)Qi(ti)dF i(ti) +
X
j∈S
Z tj
tj
(tj +
F j(tj)
f j(tj)
)Qj(tj)dF j(tj) ≥ 0
3.5 Characterization of Interim Eﬃcient Allocations
We introduce one more piece of notation and a simple lemma to ease notation.
Definition 6 If λ0i =
R ti
ti λ
i(ti)dF i(ti) > 0, let Λi(ti) = 1
λ0i
R ti
ti λ
i(s)dF i(s).8 If λ0i = 0, then
Λi(ti) = 0.
Lemma 5
R ti
ti λ
i(ti)[tiQi(ti)−
R ti
ti sdQ
i(s)]dF i(ti) = λ0i
h
tiQi(ti) +
R ti
ti
³
1−Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
´
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
i
.
8Wilson (1985) refers to Λi(·) as the conditional welfare weights of agent i.
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Proof. Integrate by parts.
We can use lemmas 3,4, and 5 to provide a slimmer version of the problem in theorem 1
where we characterize interim eﬃciency.
Theorem 2 Given x : T → X, there exists a such that η = (x, a) is interim eﬃcient iﬀ
there exist non-negative type-dependent welfare weights, {λi}Ni=1, where
P
i λ
0i > 0, and N
constants, {A0i}Ni=1, such that (x, {A0i}Ni=1) solves,
max
x∈X
NX
i=1
λ0i
"Z ti
ti
µ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti) + tiQi(ti)−A0i
#
subject to
0 ≤ Li(Qi(·), U0i)−A0i for all i
0 ≤ G(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
A0i
0 ≤ dQi(ti)/dti for all i, ti (1)
Proof. Follows from lemmas 3,4, and 5.
Without individual rationality, this problem simplifies. First, note that the (ex ante) wel-
fare weights must all be equal. That is, without loss of generality, λ0i = 1 for all i. Otherwise,
the problem has no solution since one can always improve welfare by arbitrarily large trans-
fers between agents with diﬀerent ex ante weights. Second, the constant transfers, {A0i}Ni=1,
have no welfare consequences beyond their sum. The following corollary summarizes this.
Corollary 1 Given x : T → X, there exists a such that η = (x, a) is interim eﬃcient
(without individual rationality), iﬀ there exist non-negative type-dependent welfare weights,
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{λi}Ni=1, such that for all i,j, λ0i = λ0j > 0 and x solves:
max
x∈X
NX
i=1
"Z ti
ti
µ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti) + tiQi(ti) +G(x(·))
#
subject to
0 ≤ dQi(ti)/dti for all i, ti
Proof. Obvious.
4 The regular case
In this section, we characterize the solution to the problem in theorem 2, in the case where
constraint 1 is not binding, and identify conditions under which the solution to this relaxed
problem satisfies the missing constraint. When this is true, we refer to the problem as the
regular case. We adopt a Kuhn-Tucher approach to solving for an optimum.
4.1 Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
From the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem and Theorem 2 we know that in the regular case, (x∗, a∗) is
interim eﬃcient if and only if there exists a non-negative system of type-dependent welfare
weights, {λi}Ni=1, with
PN
i=1 λ
0i > 0 for some i, individual multipliers, {ρi}Ni=1, a multiplier,
δ, and A∗0, such that (x∗, A∗0) solves
max
x∈X,A0
NX
i=1
λio
"Z ti
ti
µ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti) + tiQi(ti)−A0i
#
(2)
+
NX
i=1
ρi
£
Li(Qi(·), U0i)−A0i¤+ δ "G(x(·)) + NX
i=1
A0i
#
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and
ρi ≥ 0 for all i
0 ≤ Li(Qi(·), U0i)−A0i for all i
0 = ρi
£
Li(Qi(·), U0i)−A0i¤ for all i
δ ≥ 0
0 ≤ G(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
A0i
0 = δ[G(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
A0i]
4.2 Solving for Ai0
Suppose [λ, ρ, δ, x∗, A∗0] solves (21). First, observe that, at [x∗, A∗0], the first order conditions
of 2 with respect to A0i are necessary for an optimum, and this implies:
−λ0i − ρi + δ = 0 for all i.
Define λ ≡ maxi{λ0i}. Then ρi ≥ 0 implies δ ≥ λ ≥ λ0i for all i. Since
PN
i=1 λ
0i > 0,
this immediately implies δ > 0 and G(x∗(·)) +PNi=1A∗0i = 0. So as long as x satisfies
G(x∗(·)) +PNi=1 Li(Q∗i(·), U0i) ≥ 0, we can solve for A0i (and hence a as well). This is
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 δ ≥ λ > 0 and G(x∗(·)) +PNi=1 Li(Q∗i(·), U0i) ≥ 0 if and only if there exist
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{A∗0i}Ni=1 and {ρi}Ni=1 solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions above. Furthermore,
ρi = δ − λ0i for all i
NX
i=1
A∗0i = −G(x∗(·))
λ0i < λ =⇒ A∗0i = Li(Q∗i(·), U0i) for all i
Proof. Follows immediately from the definition of λ and the assumption that
P
i λ
0i > 0.
Remark 6 A0i = Li(Q∗i(·), U0i) implies that all the agents with low ex ante welfare weights
are taxed up to the limit of their IR constraint.
Remark 7
PN
i=1A
∗0i = G(x∗(·)) implies that PNi=1 ai(t) = C(x∗(t)) for all t. Hence there
is no ineﬃciency in production (the budget always balances).
Remark 8 If λ0i = λ, A∗0i is unconstrained and determined as residual profit from the
other agents for whom A∗0i = Li(Q∗i(·), U0i). But if G(x∗(·)) +PNi=1 Li(Q∗i(·), U0i) = 0,
then A∗0i = Li(Q∗i(·), U0i) for all i.
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4.3 Solving for x
Having dispensed with Ai0 and ρ
i, using (22) we can restate the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of
Theorem XX as ∃{λi}Ni=1 and with
PN
i=1 λ
0i > 0 such that:
x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈F
NX
i=1
λ0i
"Z ti
ti
µ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
QidF i + tiQi(ti)
#
.
+δG(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
(δ − λ0i)Li(Qi(·), U0i)
0 ≤ δ − λ
0 ≤ G(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
Li(Qi(·), U0i)
0 = [δ − λ]
Ã
G(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
Li(Qi(·), U0i)
!
Since δ ≥ λ > 0, this can be rewritten as ∃{λi}Ni=1 and δ > 0 with
PN
i=1 λ
0i > 0 such
that:
x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X
NX
i=1
λ0i
δ
"Z ti
ti
µ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)−M i(Qi(·), U0i)
#
+
NX
i=1
·Z µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti) +M i(Qi(·), U0i)
¸
−
Z
T
C(x(t))dF (t)
0 ≤ G(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
Li(Qi(·), U0i)
0 ≤ δ − λ
0 = (δ − λ)
Ã
G(x(·)) +
NX
i=1
Li(Qi(·), U0i)
!
whereM i(Qi(·), U0i) = Li(Qi(·), U0i)− tiQi(ti) = minti
hR ti
ti Q
i(s)ds− U0i(ti)
i
. This implies
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the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Suppose [x∗, A0∗] solves 2. Then ∃ a∗ such that (x∗, a∗) is interim eﬃcient if
and only if there exist {λi}Ni=1 and δ > 0 with
PN
i=1 λ
0i > 0 such that:
x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X
NX
i=1
Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
+
λ0i
δ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
+
NX
i=1
(1− λ
0i
δ
)M i(Qi(·), U0i)−
Z
C(x(t))dF (t)
0 ≤
NX
i=1
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti) +M i(Qi(·), U0i)
#
−
Z
T
C(x(t))dF (t)
0 ≤ δ − λ
0 = (δ − λ){
NX
i=1
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti) +M i(Qi(·), U0i)
#
−
Z
T
C(x(t))dF}
Remark 9 If (1− λ0iδ )M i(Qi(·), U0i) = 0, the term of the maximand in large square brackets:
W i(ti, λi, δ) ≡ ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
+
λ0i
δ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
is the virtual valuation of type ti (Myerson (1981), Wilson (1985), Gresik (1996), and Led-
yard and Palfrey (1999a, 1999b)). The virtual valuation is equal to the player’s private value
type, ti, with adjustments due to two factors. The first adjustment is for information rents,
the −1−F
i(ti)
f i(ti) term. The second adjustment is due to possible distortions arising from re-
distribution of income, which occurs because of the welfare weights, and is captured in the
expression, λ
0i
δ
1−Λi(ti)
f i(ti) .
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Remark 10 If (1− λ0iδ )M i(Qi(·), U0i) 6= 0, in many cases it simply reduces to a straightfor-
ward adjustment of the expression for the agent’s virtual valuation. For example, in Myerson
and Satterthwaite’s (1983) study of ex ante eﬃcient bargaining mechanisms, Λi(ti) = F i(ti)
and λ0i = 1 for both the buyer and the seller, but there are individual rationality constraints.
For the buyer, M i(Qi(·), U0i) = 0, and for the seller M i(Qi(·), U0i) = R titi Qi(ti)dti. There-
fore W i = ti − δ−1δ
1−F i(ti)
f i(ti) for the buyer and W
i = ti + δ−1δ
F i(ti)
f i(ti) for the seller, for suitable
choice of δ. Thus it seems the “virtual valuation” interpretation of the solution is valid quite
generally, requiring only minor adjustment when (1− λ0iδ )M i(Qi(·), U0i) 6= 0 for some i.
For the rest of this section, we assume (1− λ0iδ )M i(Qi(·), U0i) = 0.
Remark 11 In regular independent linear environments, interim eﬃcient mechanisms can
be derived by simply modifying the original first best problem by replacing the valuation
ti, with the virtual valuation W i(ti, λi, δ). This leads to a natural algorithm for the re-
laxed problem, which involves solving an ex post problem, using virtual valuations in the
place of the actual private valuations. Step 1: Set δ = λ, and for each t let x∗δ(t) solve
maxx∈X
PN
i=1W
i(ti, λi, δ)qi(x)−C(x). If
PN
i=1
R ti
ti
³
ti − 1−F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
´
qi (x∗δ(t)) dF (t | ti)−
R
T C (x
∗
δ(t)) dF (t) ≥
0, this is the solution, and go to step 4. If not, then Step 2: For every δ > λ, for each t let
x∗δ(t) solve maxx∈X
PN
i=1W
i(ti, λi, δ)qi(x)− C(x). Step 3: Find the minimum value of δ∗
such that σ(δ∗) = 0, where
σ(δ) =
NX
i=1
Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
qi (x∗δ(t)) dF (t | ti)−
Z
T
C (x∗δ(t)) dF (t).
and calculate a∗(t) using the formula in the proof of 3. Step 4: The solution is x∗δ(t).
Remark 12 The relaxed problem simply drops the second order conditions, Qiti(t
i) ≥ 0 ∀i, ti,
so the question is: When is the solution to the “relaxed” problem also a solution to the original
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problem? A complete answer to this question will give a full characterization of the regular
case. A partial answer is easier to find. Specifically, a suﬃcient condition for Qiti(t
i) ≥ 0
∀i, ti is that ∂W i∂ti ≥ 0, for all ti, i. That is virtual valuations are monotone in type. As Gresik
(1996) and Ledyard and Palfrey (1999a, 1999b) point out, this boils down to a joint condition
on priors Fi and welfare weights λ. The standard condition (i.e. without welfare weights or
participation constraints), that ti − 1−F
i(ti)
f i(ti) be increasing in t
i for all i, is neither necessary
nor suﬃcient. For example if F i is uniform on [0, 1] thenW i(ti) = ti− 1−F
i(ti)
f i(ti) +
λ0i
δ
³
1−Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
´
= ti − [1− F i(ti)] + λ0iδ [1− Λi(ti)] = 2ti − 1−
1
δ [1−
R ti
ti λ
i(s)dF i(s)]. So ∂W
i
∂ti = 2−
1
δλ
i(ti).
For the special case of constant welfare weights, say λ = 1, this implies ∂W
i
∂ti = 2 −
1
δ > 0
since δ > 1, so the solution to the relaxed problem for the uniform case is always optimal.9
But for interim eﬃciency, which allows for nonconstant λ(ti), one generally needs further
restrictions in order to satifsy the second order conditions of the full optimization problem.
For example, in the uniform case described above, the solution to the relaxed problem satisfies
the second order conditions of the full problem if and only if λi(ti) ≤ 2δ for all i, ti.
Remark 13 When ∂W
i
∂ti (
bti) < 0 for some i, bti, the constrained optimal solution can be ob-
tained by a procedure known as“ironing” (Guesnerie and Laﬀont 1985, Rochet and Choné
2000); that is, Qi must be constant over some interval, which results in flat regions, some-
times referred to as bunching of types. This raises a question of which interim eﬃcient
mechanisms are missed by the algorithm based on virtual valuations.
Remark 14 Myerson and others refer to a regular case occurring when
∂
∂ti
·
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¸
≥ 0 for all i.
9The case of constant welfare weights corresponds ex ante eﬃciency.
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This continues to be the appropriate condition if λ(ti) is constant in ti for all i. If λi(ti) is
not constant in ti for i the regularity condition requires the additional distributional term,
λ0i
δ
1−Λi(ti)
f i(ti) . That is:
∂
∂ti
·
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
+
λ0i
δ
µ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶¸
≥ 0
The derivative of of the additional term can be positive or negative, depending on how the
“welfare weights” behave. Hence, nonconstant type-contingent welfare weights can lead to
either more or less bunching, compared to the ex ante solution. An illustration of the dif-
ference can be seen when F i is the uniform districtution, where W i(ti, λi, δ) = ti − δ(1 −
ti)(1− δ)(ti − Λi) and ∂W i∂ti = 2−
1
δλ
i(ti). Notice that we are in the Myerson “regular” case
since
d
·
ti− 1−F
i(ti)
fi(ti)
¸
∂ti = 2 > 0. But, unless λ ≤ 2δ, there will be ti such that
∂W i
∂ti < 0 so the
“normal case” will not apply, and bunching will result. Observe that since the condition is
λ ≤ 2δ, regularity is satisfied for a wider range of welfare weights for higher values of δ,
which correspond (loosely speaking) to more binding participation constraints.
Remark 15 Without IR, simply let δ = λ0i for all i. Then, for the regular case, the solution
is any x∗ such that
x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X
NX
i=1
Z ti
ti
µ
ti +
F i(ti)− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)−
Z
T
C(x(t))dF (t)
Remark 16 Without IR, if λi(ti) = 1 for all i and ti, then F i(ti) = Λi(ti) for all i and ti,
implying:
x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X
Z
T
"Ã
NX
i=1
tiqi(x(t)
!
− C(x(t))
#
dF (t)
or first best.
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Remark 17 For ex ante neutral welfare weights, λio = λ for all i. In this case, the IR
constraint is non-binding iﬀ δ = λ, so,
x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X
NX
i=1
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti +
F i(ti)− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
#
−
Z
T
C(x(t))dF (t)
implies
0 ≤
NX
i=1
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)−M i(Qi(·), U0i)
#
−
Z
T
C(x(t))dF (t),
and hence x∗ is interim eﬃcient.
There are several special cases which illustrate these results.
Example 1 Consider the d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) case where λi(ti) = 1 for
all i and ti because of ex-ante eﬃciency. Then Λi(ti) = F i(ti), and there are no individual
rationality constraints, so δ = λ0i = 1. Thus, W i = ti and the first best solution is achieved.
Example 2 Consider the Ledyard andPalfrey (1999a,1999b) case where there are ex ante
neutral welfare weights, so λi0 = 1, but no individual rationality so also δ = 1. Then
W i = ti − Λ
i(ti)−F i(ti)
f i(ti) .
5 Applications
We turn to applications of the characterization of interim eﬃcient mechanisms in several
diﬀerent economic environments. Summarizing the previous section, a specific application
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consists of a specification of:
N,X,C(x), {T i, F i, qi : X → <, U0i : T i → <}Ni=1
To find a specific interim eﬃcient allocation for such an environment, one specifies a
collection of type-contingent welfare weights, {λi : T i → <+}Ni=1 and applies the techniques
outlined in the previous section.
Most of the applications we consider here have been studied in separate papers, so part of
the point of this section is to illustrate how all of these models are contained as special cases
of the general framework in this paper. Remember that, by interim eﬃcienct, we refer to
mechanisms that are eﬃcient for some type-dependent weighting scheme, relative to the class
of feasible, incentive compatible direct mechanisms satisfying interim individual rationality.
By independent linear environments, we refer to Bayesian settings with independent private
values, with utility functions linear in a one-dimensional type, and a transferable commodity,
and with feasibility also additive in that commodity. We will assume throughout this section
that we are in the “regular case” where
W i(ti, λi, δ) ≡ ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
+
λ0i
δ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
if (1− λ0iδ )M i(Qi(·), U0i) = 0 and ∂W
i(ti,α)
∂ti ≥ 0 for all ti. Where (1−
λ0i
δ )M
i(Qi(·), U0i) 6= 0
for some i we make the appropriate adjustment to that agent’s virtual valuation. We first
consider public goods environments, and then private goods environments.
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5.1 Public Goods
5.1.1 Pure Public Goods
Without IR constraints In d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979), they characterized
ex-ante eﬃcient mechanisms for a pure (nonexcludable) public good environment with in-
dependent linear types, without participation constraints. That paper also discovered the
balancing incentive taxes described in proof of lemma 3. In that environment, the incentive
constraints are not binding. That is, the first best solution is possible. Ledyard and Palfrey
(1999a, 1999b) consider the set of all interim eﬃcienct mechanisms, without participation
constraints, and show that the classical first best solution is interim eﬃcient only for the
special case of constant welfare weights. The intuition is that non constant welfare weights
imply that there should be redistribution of the private good across types. The balancing in-
centive taxes one needs to make first best allocations incentive eﬃcient will generally distort
the redistibution unless welfare weights are constant.
In the notation of this paper, the pure public goods model in Ledyard and Palfrey (1999b)
is X = [0, 1], C(x) = Kx, qi(x) = x, individual rationality was not required (i.e., δ = 1). For
the regular case, given the welfare weights, λi : T i −→ <+, an interim eﬃcient mechanism
satisfies:
x∗(t) ∈ argmax
x
ÃX
i
W i(ti, λi)−K
!
x.
where W i(ti, λi) = ti + F
i(ti)−Λi(ti)
f i(ti) . Provided the second order conditions are satisfied, the
eﬃcient public decision always involves a simple cost benefit calculation: produce x = 1 if
and only if the sum of the virtual valuations exceeds the cost of production. Otherwise,
produce x = 0. For ex ante eﬃcient mechanisms, λi(ti) = 1 for all i and ti, and simple
calculations verify W i(ti) = ti, so the problem is regular for all F . Hence ex ante eﬃcient
public decisions correspond to the classical first best.
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If λ is not constant, then interim eﬃcient mechanisms will generally have over-production
or under-production relative to the first best levels. Furthermore, this also holds for variety
of specifications of qi(x) and C(x). Suppose for example that qi(ti) = q(ti) for all i, q is
concave, increasing, and C is convex and increasing. Then a first-best decision, xo, satisfiesP
i t
i ∂q(xo)
∂x =
∂C(xo)
∂x . For interim eﬃcient mechanisms, given a set of welfare weights, a
necessary condition for interim eﬃciency in the regular case is:
NX
i=1
W i(ti, λi)
∂q(x∗)
∂x
=
∂C(x∗)
∂x
.
Therefore, if W i(ti, λi) > ti for all t then x∗λ(t) ≥ xo(t) and over-production is interim
eﬃcient. Indeed,W i(ti, λi) > ti occurs, for example, if λi(ti) is increasing in ti. That is, when
higher types are more heavily weighted than lower types, over-production is a more eﬃcient
way to relax incentive compatibility constraints than transfers, ai. The economic intuition
behind this result is the following. First, since higher types are weighted more heavily,
welfare is increased either by shifting taxes from high types to low types or by producing the
public good more often. However, the only way to shift the tax burden from higher types to
lower types, without violating incentive compatibility or feasibility, is to produce the public
good less often, which would make high types worse oﬀ. This intuition is not dependent on
the linearity of qi in x or the linearity of the production technology.
With IR constraints Finally, we look at the case of interim eﬃciency with individual
rationality constraints, which is handled by this general framework. Two easy facts can be
observed for regular environments. For simplicity, we deal only with the case of constant
welfare weights (ex ante eﬃciency), but the same results hold with general welfare weights.
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For this case,
W i(ti, λi, δ) ≡ ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
+
λ0i
δ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
does not reduce to W i(ti, λi, δ) ≡ ti, because δ > 1. Instead, one gets
W i(ti, λi, δ) ≡ ti −
µ
1− λ
0i
δ
¶
1− F i(ti)
f i(ti)
Therefore virtual valuations are lower, so the eﬃcient choice of x is always lower with
individual rationality constraints than without. For example, supposeX = [0, 1], C(x) = Kx
and qi(x) = x. Then for some realizations of t such that
P
i t
i −K is positive, but not very
large, it will be necessary to produce zero because there is not enough surplus to cover
incentive costs without violating individual rationality.
The second observation follows from Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), and addresses ex
ante eﬃciency in large N environments. To illustrate their result in the context of our model,
suppose costs increase linearly in N so that C(x) = Nc(x). Further, assume qi(x) = q(x)
for all i, q is concave and c is convex. Ex ante eﬃcient mechanisms solve, for each t,
1
N
P
iW
i(ti, δ)∂q(x
∗(t))
∂x =
∂c(x∗(t))
∂x for suitably chosen δ. As N →∞, by the law of large num-
bers, for any fixed value of δ, 1N (
P
iW
i(ti, δ)) converges to the expected virtual valuation,
call it, W (δ). So, for any given δ > 1, as N → ∞, x∗(t) → x(δ) for all t, where x(δ) is
defined by W (δ)∂q(x(δ))∂x =
∂c(x(δ))
∂x . Thus Q
i(ti)→ q(x(δ)) for all i and ti. Incentive compat-
ibility then requires that Ai(ti) → A, a constant, and feasibility requires that A = c(x(δ)),
the average cost share. Finally, given Qi(ti) = q(x(δ)) and A
i
= c(x(δ)), the individual
rationality constraint is that tiq(x(δ)) ≥ c(x(δ)) for all ti. But then
P
i t
iq(x(δ)) ≥ Nc(x(δ))
for all t. If ti < 0 and c(x) > 0 for all x > 0, then we must have q(x(δ)) = 0. So, unless
it is first-best optimal to produce positive amounts of the public good for all realizations of
t, the individually rational ex ante eﬃcient level of public good production goes to zero as
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N →∞.
5.1.2 Excludable Public Goods
Without IR constraints An excludable public good is one for which i’s consumption of
the good is allowed to be any yi such that 0 ≤ yi ≤ x. So U i = tiqi(yi)− ai, x ∈ R+. Here,
(x, yi, . . . , yN) is feasible if and only if x ≥ 0, 0 ≤ yi ≤ x for i = 1, . . . , N .
The social decision for an interim eﬃcient mechanism thus solves
max
(x,yi,...,yN )
NX
i=1
W i(ti, λi)qi(yi)− h(x)
subject to x ∈ R+, 0 ≤ yi ≤ x.
So assuming dq
i
dyi > 0, and second order conditions are satisfied, interim eﬃcient allocations
satisfy, for each t,
x∗(t) ∈ argmax
x
NX
i=1
max
©
W i(ti, λi), 0
ª
qi(x)− h(x)
and yi = x iﬀ W i(ti, λi) ≥ 0.
For ex-ante eﬃciency, W i(ti) = ti. So in these cases:
x∗ ∈ argmax
x
NX
i=1
max
©
ti, 0
ª
qi(x)− h(x)
and yi = x iﬀ ti ≥ 0. If ti ≥ 0, then yi = x always and there is no diﬀerence between the
ex ante eﬃcient mechanisms in pure public good case and the excludable case. The threat
of exclusion provides no help in relaxing incentive constraints, simply because incentive
constraints are not binding to begin with.
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For interim eﬃciency, W i = ti − Λi(ti)−F i(ti)f i(ti) . So yi = x iﬀ ti ≥
Λi(ti)−F i(ti)
f i(ti) and x
∗(t) ∈
argmaxx
P
imax
n
ti − Λ
i(ti)−F i(ti)
f i(ti) , 0
o
qi(x)−h(x). It follows that if the welfare weights favor
low types then Λi(ti) − F i(ti) > 0 and there is lower production of x and more types are
excluded than under the ex ante eﬃcient mechanism. If the weights favor high types then
Λi(ti)− F i(ti) < 0 and there is higher production and less exclusion realtive to the ex ante
eﬃcient mechanism.10
With IR constraints Cornelli (2000) examined ex ante eﬃciency with individual ratio-
nality constraints for excludable public goods. Applying our techniques, in regular environ-
ments, the ex ante optimal mechanism we get, for suitably chosen δ > 1:
max
x≥0
NX
i=1
max
½
ti − δ − 1
δ
1− F (ti)
f i(ti)
, 0
¾
qi(x)− h(x),
and yi = x iﬀ ti ≥ δ − 1
δ
1− F i(ti)
f i(ti)
,
where δ is minimized on δ ≥ 1 subject to
NX
i=1
Z
T i
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
qi(yiδ)dF
i(ti) ≥
Z
T
h(xδ(t))dF (t).
Several observations can be made. If individual rationality is binding then it may be ex-ante
or interim-eﬃcient to exclude some ti even though ex post it would be eﬃcient to include
them. This occurs when, for some i there exist ti > 0 > ti − δ−1δ
1−F i(ti)
f i(ti) . So exclusion
does provide help in relaxing the individual rationality constraints. However, note that the
individual rationality constraint is not always binding. If tif(ti) ≥ 1, then W i(ti, δ) ≥ 0, so
10Coughlan (1999) studies excludable public goods with congestion costs, and no IR constraint. The
results are similar, with an adjustment term for the crowding externality.
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exclusion is never used.11
Limiting results with exclusion for N → ∞ Does exclusion provide a way around
the Malaith and Postlewaite (1990) result? Let us look at ex ante eﬃciency for the linear
symmetric case where qi(yi) = yi, C(x) = Nkx where k = K/N , F i = F j for all i, j, and
x ∈ [0, 1]. The ex ante eﬃcient mechanism (ignoring IR constraints) has the property that
as N →∞, x→ 1 if E[max{ti, 0}] > k and x→ 0 if Eti [max{ti, 0}] < k.
Next consider the ex ante eﬃcient solution when the IR constraint constraint is binding.
For the appropriate δ > 1, let t0δ solve W
i(t0δ, δ) = 0, or t
0
δ − δ−1δ
1−F i(t0δ)
f i(t0δ)
= 0. That is, t0δ
is the boundary type separating those who are excluded from those who are not excluded,
given δ . Then the individual rationality constraint reduces to
R t
t0δ
³
t− 1−F (t)f(t)
´
dF (t) ≥ k if
x→ 1. So if there is a value of δ > 1 such that t0δ(1− F (t0δ)) ≥ k then positive production
of the public good occurs even as N →∞, and some types will be excluded.
Does interim eﬃciency change these properties as N →∞?Without individual rational-
ity constraints,W i = ti−Λ
i(ti)−F i(ti)
f i(ti) and i is excluded iﬀW
i(ti, λi) < 0. Let toi be the solution
toW i(toi, λi) = 0 and consider the regular case where ∂W
i(ti,λi)
∂ti ≥ 0. Now x→ 1 asN →∞ iﬀ
E[max{W i, 0}] ≥ k. That is x→ 1 asN →∞ iﬀ toi(Λi (toi)−F i(toi))+RTto(sλ(s)dF (ti) ≥ k.
So there will be positive production of the public good. Also if low types are favored, (that
is, λ is decreasing in type), then relative to ex ante eﬃciency there will be more exclusion
and less production. The opposite is true if high types are favored.
Next consider the limiting solution with individual rationality constraints. For suitable
δ, an interim eﬃcient mechanism excludes all t ≤ bt where bt satisfies
bt− 1− F (bt)
f
¡bt¢ + 1δ 1− Λ(bt)f ¡bt¢ = 0
11For the uniform distribution tf(t) ≥ 1 iﬀ t ≥ (1/2)t.
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In the limit, either q(t) = 1 for all t or q(t) = 0 for all t depending on whether
R tbt W i(t, λ, δ)dF i(t) ≷
k. To determine the suitable δ, note that the participation constraint is satisfied in the limit
if
NX
i=1
Z
T i
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qiδ(t
i)dF i(ti) ≥
Z
T
C(xδ(t))dF (t)
iﬀbt(1− F (bt)) ≥ k
Therefore, choose to such that to(1 − F (to)) = k, if it exists, and choose δ to solve to −
1−F (to)
f(to) +
1
δ
1−Λ(to)
f(to) = 0. Then in the limit, an interim eﬃcient mechanism excludes i if t
i < to
and produces if and only if
R t
to W
i(t, λ, δ)dF i(t) ≥ k which holds if and only if
R t
to λ(t)dt ≥ k.
When F is uniform on [0, 1], W i(t, λ, δ) = 2t − 1 + 1δ (1 − Λ(t)) and (1 − to) = k. If
k > 1
4
then x = 0 and N → ∞. If k ≤ 1
4
, then x → 1 as N → ∞, to = 1
2
− 1
2
√
1− 4k and
1−δ
δ =
2to−Λ(to)
1−Λ(to) . W
i(t, λ, δ) = 2t−1+
³ √
1−4k
1−Λ(to)
´
(1−Λ (to)). And dW idt (to) = 2−
³ √
1−4k
1−Λ(to)
´
λ(to).
Notice that, as is true in general, t0 does not depend on the welfare weights. When the
individual rationality constraints are binding as N →∞, the cut-oﬀ point for exclusion, to,
is such that if all who are not excluded pay equal shares then costs are exactly covered -
no matter which type is preferred. So in the limit all interim mechanisms converge to the
ex ante optimal mechanism. If tthere is a to such that to (1− F (to)) = k, then x = 1, t is
excluded iﬀ t ≤ to, those excluded pay nothing and those not excluded pay to. If there is no
such to then x = 0.
5.2 Private Goods
Myerson (1981), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Wilson (1993), Cramton, Gibbons, and
Klemperer (1988) and others have studied ex ante eﬃcient mechanisms for linear private
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good environments.12 In our notation, for all of these settings,
X = {x ∈ <N |
NX
i−1
xi ≤ J}
U i = tiqi − ai
C(x) = 0
where J is the quantity of private good available.
In the exchange environments considered here, the set of agents is divided into two
categories, buyers and sellers. Buyers are assumed to have no endowment of the good to
be exchanged, but unlimited amounts of the transferable utility good. The buyers and
sellers have qi(x) = xi. Each seller owns one unit of the good to be exchanged and this is
reflected in their individual rationality constraints, which are type dependent. For example
U0i(ti) = ti if i is a supplier of 1 unit. These problems neatly divide themselves into specific
applications, depending on the number of buyers and sellers. We distinguish the following
four applications in this way:
1. Bargaining: 1 buyer and 1 seller
2. Markets: I > 1 buyers and J > 1 sellers
3. Auctions: I buyers and 1 seller (or 1 buyer and J sellers)
4. Assignment : I buyers and 0 sellers
12Gresik (1996) and Wilson (1985) consider interim eﬃcient mechanisms in private good settings.
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5.2.1 Bargaining: One buyer and one seller
In the simplest case, due to Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) and Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) ||B|| = ||S|| = 1. the original Myerson-Satterthwaite problem. Let p(t) = 1 − xs(t)
be the probability of a trade, and write the mechanism design problem as first choosing,
for each possible δ ≥ 1, a probability pδ(t) ∈ [0, 1], such that, for each t = (tb, ts), pδ(t)
maximizes:
pδ(t)
½µ
tb − 1− F
b(tb)
f b(tb)
+
1
δ
1− Λb(tb)
f b(tb)
¶
−
µ
ts +
F s(ts)
f s(ts)
− 1
δ
Λs(ts)
f s(ts)
¶¾
and then select the minimum value of δ that satisfies:
Z
T
·µ
tb − 1− F
b(tb)
f b(tb)
¶
−
µ
ts +
F s(ts)
f s(ts)
¶¸
pδ(tb, ts)dF b(tb)dF s(ts) ≥ 0
Denoting that minimum value by δ∗, the resulting mechanism, pδ∗, is interim eﬃcient.
With uniform priors on [0, 1], trade occurs iﬀ
tb − ts ≥ 1
2
"
δ − 1
δ
+
1
δ
(Z tb
0
λB(s)ds−
Z ts
0
λs(s)ds
)#
.
In the ex ante case λb(t) = 1 = λs(t), so trade occurs iﬀ (2 − 1δ )(tb − ts) ≥
1
δ where
δ just satisfies the individual rationality constraint. To contrast this with other possible
interim eﬃcient mechanisms, consider two possible alternative welfare weights, λ1(t) = 2t
and λ2(t) = 2(1−t). λ1 weights high types more heavily than low types, λ2 does the opposite.
Note that Λ1 = t2 and Λ2 = 2t− t2. Letting Λb = Λ1 and Λs = Λ2 we can see that trade will
occur iﬀ (2− 1δ )(tb− ts)−
1
δ −
δ−1
δ [t
b(tb−1)+ ts(ts−1)] ≥ 0. Since [tb(tb−1)+ ts(ts−1)] < 0,
this inequality will be satisfied for more (tb, ts) than was the case for ex ante eﬃcieny for the
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same α. Thus more trade occurs.13 Reversing the Λ’s so that Λb = Λ2 and Λs = Λ1 leads to
less trade than is ex ante eﬃcient.
5.2.2 Markets: Many buyers and many sellers
In this framework, the results of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Gresik (1996) are
easily extended to n buyers and m sellers. Let X = {x|Pn+mi=1 xi = m}. So, ∃a∗ such that
(x∗, a∗) is incentive eﬃcient if and only if ∃λ, δ such that
x∗ ∈ argmax
x∈X
X
i∈B
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
+
λ0i
δ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
#
(3)
+
X
i∈S
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti +
F i(ti)
f i(ti)
− λ
0i
δ
Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
#
(4)
subject to:
0 ≤
X
i∈B
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
#
+
X
i∈S
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti +
F i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
#
0 ≤ δ − λ
0 = (δ − λ){
X
i∈B
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
#
+
X
i∈S
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti +
F i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
#
}
13Of course the optimal value of δ may vary with the welfare weights.
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5.2.3 Auctions: Many buyers and one seller (or one buyer and many sellers)
The problem of designing revenue-maximizing auctions when buyers have independent pri-
vate values was initiated by Vickrey (1961), but not solved until 1981, when three papers
were published almost simultaneously by Harris and Raviv (1981), Myerson (1981), and
Riley and Samuelson (1981).
Here, we address a more general version of the problem, characterizing all interim eﬃ-
cient auctions. The expected revenue maximizing auction14 arises as a special case, which
corresponds in our framework to setting all the buyers’ welfare weights to 0, and setting the
seller’s welfare weights to a positive constant. For that special case, itis already well known
that the optimal mechanism can be implemented many simple ways, such as a second price
auction with a publicly announced reserve bid, where the reserve bid is a function of the
seller’s type.
In the general case with type-dependent seller weights, the implementation of optimal
mechanisms by auctions can be much more complicated, in particular, secret reserve bids and
bid-dependent reserve bids may be optimal. This is true, even if the buyer welfare weights
are equal to 0. If buyer welfare weights are positive, the problem is even further complicated.
At the opposite extreme, where all the weight is on the buyers’ welfare, the problem become
equivalent to the general assignment problem, which is analyzed in the next section.
Denote the seller by s, and the buyers by i = 1, ..., n. Recall that, for the buyers, (1 −
λ0i
δ )M
i(Qi(·), U0i) = 0, and for the sellers, (1− λ0sδ )Ms(Qs(·), U0s) = (1− λ
0s
δ )
R ts
ts Q
s(ts)dts.
Therefore, it follows from Theorem XX that ∃a∗ such that (x∗, a∗) is an interim eﬃcient
auction if and only if there exist nonegative functions λs(ts), {λi(ti)}I , not all 0, and δ such
14Formally, this is only revenue maximization if the seller’s type is 0. It would be more precise to call this
expected profit maximization, where the seller’s type can be viewed as the cost.
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that x∗ maximizes
Z ts
ts
µ
ts +
F s(ts)
f s(ts)
− λ
0s
δ
Λs(ts)
f i(ts)
¶
Qs(ts)dF s(ts)
+
nX
i=1
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
+
λ0i
δ
1− Λs(ts)
f i(ts)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
#
and :
0 ≤
Z ti
ti
µ
ts +
F s(ts)
f s(ts)
¶
Qs(ts)dF s(ts)
+
nX
i=1
Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
0 ≤ δ − λ
0 = (δ − λ){
Z ts
ts
µ
ts +
F s(ts)
f s(ts)
¶
Qs(ts)dF s(ts) +
nX
i=1
Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)}
We next show how the familiar revenue maximization problem falls out of our framework.
Revenue maximization For revenue maximization, assume that λi(ti) = 0 for all i and
ti, and λs(ts) = 1 for all ts. This implies that welfare is maximized by maximizing the
expected surplus to the seller. It follows immediately from theorem XX that ∃a∗ such that
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(x∗, a∗) is an interim eﬃcient auction if and only if there exists δ ≥ 1 such that x∗ maximizes
Z ts
ts
µ
ts + (1− 1
δ
)
F s(ts)
f s(ts)
¶
Qs(ts)dF s(ts)
+
nX
i=1
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
#
and :
0 ≤
Z ti
ti
µ
ts +
F s(ts)
f s(ts)
¶
Qs(ts)dF s(ts)
+
nX
i=1
Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
0 ≤ δ − 1
0 = (δ − 1){
Z ts
ts
µ
ts +
F s(ts)
f s(ts)
¶
Qs(ts)dF s(ts)
+
nX
i=1
Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)}
Assuming individual rationality is not binding on the seller, the inequality constraint is
slack, so δ = 1. Assuming we are in the regular case, this gives us the following well-known
solution.
Proposition 1 Pick any buyer i∗ ∈ argmaxi
n
ti − 1−F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
o
. If ti
∗ − 1−F (t
i∗ )
f(ti∗) ≥ t
s, then sell
to i∗. Otherwise do not sell.
Remark 18 In the regular case, if all buyers draw valuations from the same distribution,
this corresponds to direct mechanism where a sale is made if and only if ti ≥ et, for some
buyer, where et− 1−F (et)
f(et) = ts. Buyer i pays a price equal to ti − 1−F (ti)f(ti) and other buyers pay
0. This allocation can be implemented by many diﬀerent kinds of auctions; for example, the
seller could publicly announce a reserve bid equal to et and then hold a first or second price
auction. If buyers’ valuations are drawn from diﬀerent distributions then each buyer i would
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have a personalized reserve bid, eti defined by eti − 1−F i(eti)
f i(eti) = ts. As Myerson noted, profit
maximizing auctions are generally ineﬃcient for two reasons. First, sellers restrict sales by
use of the reserve bid, so sometimes the good is not sold even when all buyers value it more
than the seller. Second, sellers discriminate between buyers with diﬀerent value distributions,
so even if the good is sold, it may not be purchased by the highest valuation buyer.
Interim eﬃcient auctions that are not revenue maximizing We next consider the
case where the welfare weights are still concentrated on the seller, but the welfare weights
are not the same for all seller types, so that λi = 0 for i = 1, ..., n as before, but λs(ts) is not
constant.15 This case is more interesting for two reasons. First, F s−Λs 6= 0, so there will be
cross subsidization of seller types. Second it is possible that δ > 1, if there is suﬃcient cross
subsidization that individual rationality is binding on some seller types. This could arise,
for example, if some sellers whose valuations are in the support of the buyers’ valuations are
earning 0 profits).
Without loss of generality, we can normalize λs(ts) so that λ0s = 1. By doing so, for
suitably chosen δ the maximand in expression YY becomes:
Z ts
ts
µ
ts +
F s(ts)
f s(ts)
− 1
δ
Λs(ts)
f i(ts)
¶
Qs(ts)dF s(ts)
+
nX
i=1
"Z ti
ti
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qi(ti)dF i(ti)
#
or Z
T
"µ
ts +
F s(ts)
f s(ts)
− 1
δ
Λs(ts)
f i(ts)
¶
qs(t) +
nX
i=1
µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
qi(t)
#
dF s(ts).
Because δ is chosen so that individual rationality is just binding, we must have δ = 1. Hence,
15For example, λs decreasing corresponds to a seller who is more concerned about earning profits when
his valuation is low than when his valuation is high.
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it is optimal16 for each seller type ts to set bidder-specific reserve bids, each of which is a
price,eti, satisfying eti − 1− F i(eti)
f i(eti) = ts + F s(ts)− Λs(ts)f s(ts) .
Thus we can see that the reserve bid principle continues to hold. That is, the optimal
auction corresponds to a direct mechanism in which the seller rejects any bid less than eti.
The standard construction of the a∗ indicates that this can be implemented by a second
price auction with a reserve bid, where the second price is the maximum of eti and the second
highest bid. However, there are two important diﬀerences. First, the reserve bids must be
made secret.17 Second, the seller must commit to the (secret) reserve bid rule, since the
reserve bid does not maximize interim expected profits, except in the special case when
F s(ts) = Λs(ts). For example, if seller welfare weights are increasing then reserve bids will
tend to be higher, since F s(ts) > Λs(ts), and the good is sold less often. If seller welfare
weights are decreasing, then reserve bids will tend to be lower.
Finally, suppose the welfare weight on buyers is not zero. Then we are back to the market
setting with J = 1.
5.2.4 Assignment: J objects, no sellers
There are two cases to distinguish here, depending on whether the individuals share prior
claims to the objects. If they do, then we are in an environment similar to Cramton, Gibbons,
and Klemperer (1987), who explore some properties of ex ante eﬃciency for the J = 1 case,
when the I individuals share property rights on a single object. Again, this leads to a model
where individual rationality constraints are type specific.
16We are still assuming the regular case.
17With publicly announced reserve bids, the best you can do is to set the interim profit maximizing reserve
bid: eti − 1−F i(eti)fi(eti) = ts.
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Here we deal with the second case, where there are no prior claims, so the individual
rationality constraints are the same as in the standard auction problem (U i ≥ 0). Ex ante
eﬃciency has been characterized by Dudek, Kim, Ledyard (1995).
The problem is a special case of the multilateral bargaining environment studied in XX,
with λi(ti) = 0 for all i ∈ S and for all ti ∈ T i, and ts = 0 for all s. Then C(x) = 0, qi(x) = yi,
U i = tiyi − ai and feasibility requires 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1, and 0 ≤
Pn
i=1 q
i ≤ J . Normalizing λ0i = 1
for the buyers, we have W i(ti) = ti − 1−F
i(ti)
f i(ti) +
1
δ
1−Λi(ti)
f i(ti) . Since the sellers’ interim utility is
given zero weight in the welfare function, W i(ti) = 0 for all i ∈ S. Assuming regularity, the
interim eﬃcient mechanism picks the J largest i such that:
W i(ti) = ti − 1− F
i
f i
+
λ0i
δ
1− Λi(ti)
f i(ti)
≥ 0
and sets qiδ = 1 for each of these agents, where δ is the smallest value greater than or equal
to 1 such that:
nX
i=1
Z µ
ti − 1− F
i(ti)
f i(ti)
¶
Qiδ(t
i)dF i(ti) ≥ 0 for all i.
If there are fewer than J agents for whom W i(ti) ≥ 0, then some of the goods are allocated
to nobody.18
If F i(ti) = F and Λi = Λ = 1 for all i then in the regular case interim eﬃcient rules (with
free disposal) award the items to the subset of the J highest ti whose values are larger than
some critical value, to. This to is the value of t for which W i(t, λ, δ) = 0 when δ is chosen so
that the individual rationality constraint just binds. This can be accomplished in a variety of
ways, such as entry fees and reserve bids, depending on the exact details of the environment.
The critical value is dependent on F and Λ. Let Qi(ti) = prob {ti ≥ tJ} where tJ is the
18This assumes free disposal. If all goods must be allocated, then some units may be allocated to agents
with negative virtual valuations.
41
J-highest tj of all j 6= i. Let tδ solve min R ttδ ³t− 1−F i(ti)f i(ti) ´Q(t)dF (t) ≥ 0. Notice that as
we change δ the ranking of the ti stays exactly the same as the ranking of the W i(ti, λ, δ),
which directly implies that the items are always awarded to the highest ti ≥ tδ. So δ only
aﬀects whether W i(tδ, λ, δ) ≥ 0. Finding tδ above is equivalent to minimizing δ. At this
value of δ, W i(tδ, λ, δ) = 0. This result is also independent of Λ(t), the interim weights in
the symmetric case.
When F is uniform on [0, 1] then it is possible to show that individual rationality con-
straints are never binding, so δ = 1. In fact, any feasible incentive compatible mechanism
is individually rational in the uniform case. To see this, notice first that incentive compati-
bility implies Qi is increasing for all i. Therefore, to prove that individual rationality is not
binding, it is suﬃcient to show that
R 1
0
(2ti − 1)Qi(ti)dti ≥ 0 for all non-decreasing functions
Qi. Integrating
R 1
0
(2ti − 1)Qi(ti)dti by parts gives
Z 1
0
¡
2ti − 1
¢
Qi(ti)dti =
Z 1
0
Qi(ti)dti −
Z 1
0
2
"Z ti
0
Qi(si)dsi
#
dti
≥
Z 1
0
Qi(ti)dti −
Z 1
0
2tiQi(ti)dti
= −
Z 1
0
¡
2ti − 1
¢
Qi(ti)dti
Therefore
Z 1
0
¡
2ti − 1
¢
Qi(ti)dti ≥ 0
The second step follows because
R ti
0
Qi(si)dsi ≤ tiQi(ti) for all nondecreasing Qi. Therefore,
it follows that in the uniform case, δ = 1, regardless of the welfare weights. So, the virtual
valuations reduce to:
W i(ti, λi) = 2ti − 1 +
Z 1
ti
λi(ti)dti
This implies immediately that the ex ante eﬃcient solution coincides with the ex post eﬃcient
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solution in the uniform case. The same is true for any interim eﬃcient mechanism, provided
λi(ti) ≤ 2 (i.e. the regular case), since
W i(0, λi) = 2ti − 1 +
Z 1
0
λi(ti)dti
= 0− 1 + λ0i
= 0
.
5.2.5 Complementarities and Single-minded buyers
The optimal mechanism ranks all i by W i and awards an item to the M highest: buyers
with high ti get an item, sellers with high ti keep their item. We turn now to an application
of these methods to the problem of allocating M objects to N people who have preferences
for bundles of discrete private goods. We will illustrate this with the special case of single-
minded buyers, which is an extreme case of complementarity.19 Specifically, each person
will be identified by a unique subset Si ⊆ M of the M objects which they want and a
utility function such that U i = tiqi(z) − ai where z ⊆ M and qi(M) = 1 if Si ⊆ M and
qi(M) = 0 otherwise.20 This is another special case of our structure in which interim eﬃcient
mechanisms pick q to
maximize
nX
i=1
W i(ti)qi
19Levin (1997) investigates a similar model for the case of two goods.
20Ideally we would like to analyze the case in which ui =
P
s⊆M q
i
st
i
s where q
i
s = 1 if i gets object s. But
that involves multi-dimensional types.
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S.T. qi ∈ [0, 1]
qi = 1 if Cik = 1∀k ∈ si
0 otherwise
and
Pn
i=1C
i
k = 1 ∀k
and then minimize α. A full analysis of this problem remains to be done but a simple example
oﬀers some insight into the nature of eﬃcient mechanisms in these environments. Suppose
N = 3, S1 = {a}, S2 = {b}, and S3 = {a, b}. Further assume ti ∼ uniform [0, 1 for each
i. The ex ante eﬃcient mechanism awards the pair of items to 3 if W 3(t, α) = t3 − α1−Ff ≥
t2 − α1−Ff + t3 − α
1−F
f . It awards them to 1 and 2 otherwise. In this case
1−F
f = 1− t so 3
wins to iﬀ t3−α(1− t3) ≥ t1−α(1− ti)−α(1− t2) or iﬀ t3 ≥ t1+ t2− α
1+α . So if individual
rationality is binding the items can be awarded to 3 even though the first best allocation
would award them to 1 and 2. This happens when t3 + α
1+α > t
1 + t2 > t3. If one wants
to maximize expected revenue, simply set α = 1 so now 3 wins whenever t3 + 1
2
≥ t1 + t2.
The optimal ex ante auction is not first best eﬃcient even if types are one dimensional and
utility is linear in type.
If there is an option not to sell then each i should be excluded when t1 − (1 − ti) =
2ti − 1 < 0 or ti < 1/2. So let ti = max{2ti − 1, 0}. Then, if ti ≥ 1/2 for all i, 3 wins iﬀ
W 3 ≥ W 1 +W 2. 1 and 2 win otherwise. However, the goods will not be awarded to an
agent for whom 2ti − 1 < 0. Hence the solution is summarized in the following table:
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t3 < 1
2
t3 > 1
2
t1 < 1
2
, t2 < 1
2
No one 3 wins
t1 < 1
2
, t2 > 1
2
only 2 wins 3 wins if t3 ≥ t2
2 wins if t3 ≥ t3
t1 > 1/2, t2 < 1
2
only 1 wins 3 wins if t3 ≥ t1
1 wins if t1 ≥ t3
t1 > 1
2
, t2 > 1/2 1 and 2 win 3 wins if t3 + 1
2
≥ t1 + t2
1 + 2 win otherwise
Buyers 1 and 2 each win with probability equal to 27/64. Buyer 3 wins with probability
equal to 17/64. This compares to 3
4
and 1
4
, respectively, under a first-best allocation, so
agent 3 wins “too often”, and the other two agents are excluded too often, relative to the
first best.
6 Conclusions
This paper presented a general framework to study the theoretical properties of interim
eﬃcient mechanisms in independent linear environments. Interim eﬃcient allocation rules
are fully characterized for these environments. For regular environments, the solution is of-
ten obtainable by applying classical welfare analysis, substituting easily computable virtual
utilities for the agents’ actual utilities. We illustrated this approach with a series of appli-
cations, some of which has been studied elsewhere in the literature, including both public
goods and private goods applications. Other applications can also be analyzed in a similar
way, including the problem of optimal cartel agreements (Cramton and Palfrey 1990), opti-
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mal reallocation of a jointly owned asset (Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer 1987), optimal
regulatory mechanisms (Baron and Myerson 1982), transfer pricing in organizations, and so
forth.
Several directions for future research seem promising. First, the incoporation of common
or aﬃliated values can be done, at least for some specifications. For example, Myerson’s
(1981) revision eﬀects can be incorporated with only minor adjustments to the virtual val-
uations. A second issue, correlated types, inovolve some special features that we do not
consider here, namely using complicated side-payments schemes that exploit the correlation
in order to relax incentive constraints. These are used elsewhere, for example Cremer and
McLean (1988) and indeed can often relax incentive constraints fully, so that first best is
acheivable. However, due to the complicated nature of the sidepayments, these mechanisms
may be impractical in most situations and also fail if there are limited liablility constraints
or if collusion is possible (Laﬀont and Martimort 2000). Third, there are interesting open
questions about the asymptotic properties of interim eﬃcient allocations. Fourth, the ap-
plications studied here only considered the regular case, and the exact details of eﬃcient
mechanisms for these applications in the irregular case is not fully solved. While it is known
that optimal mechanisms will have flat regions in the irregular case, a deeper understanding
may be required in order to answer general questions about the asymptotic properties of the
set of interim eﬃcient allocations.
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